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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
as a fact that the confidence necessarily reposed in a physician would
tend to lull the patient into a feeling of security and thereby to allow
what might have been a valid cause of action to become barred by
the passage of time.3" We have seen that a contract action provides
only a small measure of relief. The treatment theory as enunciated
in Gillette v. Tucker 40 and Sly v. Van Lengen is not founded so much
in sound reasoning as in an indirect attempt to get around Section 50.
Although it is reassuring to know that the courts realize the injus-
tices caused by the statute, the proper remedy, nevertheless, is not
with them but with the legislature that produced it.
The Monahan, Rudnan and Isenstein cases introduced another
source of criticism concerning the Statute of Limitations for mal-
practice. In justice to the Monahan opinion, it must be admitted
that the statute was undoubtedly passed because of the uncertainty
attending the treatment of any disease in the beginning and the diffi-
culty of tracing the results of such treatment as time goes on. But
this does not necessarily exclude a realization of the fact that Section
50 was adopted as an indulgence to a favored class. Generally speak-
ing, those who have shown their respect for our laws have always
constituted a "favored class" in the eyes of the legislature. In this
instance, that class consists of licensed practitioners. It has been the
avowed purpose of both the legislature and our courts to discourage
those who disobey the law. Extending the benefit of a short period
of limitation to illegal practitioners is hardly a means to this end.
On the other hand, a registered nurse should be granted this indul-
gence. In such case, the statute would still be serving its purpose as
expressed by Justice Staley, but it would be a source of protection
only to those who deserve the "blessing" of the law.
It is submitted that amendment of the Statute of Limitations
as to malpractice is the only solution to the problem. As long as
Section 50 continues to remain on the books in its present form, our
courts will be saddled with an unnecessarily ambiguous statute. An
amended statute, explicit in terms and leaving no room for doubt on
any point, would prevent further injustice. This section, perhaps
more than any other, merits the attention of the revisers of our Civil
Practice Act.
ROSE GRESS.
A CURRENT PROBLEM IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF RELIGION
Labor cases excepted, there is, perhaps, no more fruitful source
of the law governing inter-group relations than the litigation which
has resulted from attacks upon minority groups. Typical are the
39 (1923) 37 H.&iv. L. REV. 272.
40 See note 14, supra.
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many court appearances of Jehovah's Witnesses.' The Witnesses 2 are
usually looked upon as a religious group 3 but they object
violently to the application to them of any form of the word "re-
ligious". 4 Instead they prefer to describe themselves as persons who
have made a covenant with Jehovah, God, to do His will as outlined
in the Scriptures. 5 One of the scriptural commands upon which they
place great importance is the admonition to preach the word of God
from house to house.6  This they do literally, carrying with them
books, pamphlets and periodicals as well as phonograph records which
they play for all who will give them a hearing.
The literature and records are, for the most part, the products
of judge Rutherford 7 who succeeded to the leadership of the Wit-
nesses shortly after the death in 1916 of the founder, Charles Taze
Russell.8 The doctrines contained therein are substantially Adventist
and the Second Coming of Christ is the foundation of what might
be called their theology.
Russell had calculated that the Second Coming had taken place
in 1874 9 (albeit invisibly) and that the final destruction of the world
would take place in 1914.10 Rutherford, however, prefers to look
upon 1914 as the "beginning of the end"." He contends that there
is now taking place on earth a great battle between the World, under
the leadership of Satan, and the forces of Jehovah, God, i.e., His
Witnesses.
I RUTHERFORD, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES DEFENDED 1. Over three thousand
arrests occur annually. The recorded cases are now numbered in the hundreds.
2 Cf. Isaiah 43:10-12. "Ye are my witnesses, saith the Lord."
"Witnesses" is usually spelled by members of the group with a small "w".
To avoid ambiguity, however, a capital "W" will be used throughout this note.
3 It is extremely difficult for the average individual to disassociate religion
from the worship of God as the Witnesses attempt to do.
4 See note 14, infra.
5 Among their number the Witnesses include Christ (Whose Divinity they
deny), Abel, Abraham and "all the faithful prophets from Moses to John the
Baptist," RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 18, 20, as well as the contemporary Wit-
nesses, many of whom shall never die. RUTHERFORD, HARP OF GOD 255. REv.
(Apoc.) 7:9-17.
6 Cf. Luke 9:14; RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 29.
7 Joseph F. Rutherford served as a judge on four separate days in the
Circuit Court, Boonville, Mo., in accordance with the Missouri statutes of that
time which permitted members of the local bar to select one of their members
as a substitute in the absence of the regular judge. Cir. Ct Rec., Cooper
County, Mo. Book 20, p. 576, Feb. 7, 1899; Book 22, p. 73, July 23, 1899;
Book 25, p. 213, March 15, 1905; Book 25, p. 239, March 29, 1905.
8 The first corporation with which the Witnesses were connected was
formed in Pennsylvania in 1884 under the direction of Russell. RUTHERFORD,
THEOCRACY 16, 17.
52, 3 RUSSELL, STUDIES IN THE SCRIPTURES; RUTHERFORD, HARP OF GOD
251; RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 29, 33.
10 (1939) 37 THE CATHOLIC MIND 771, 772, citing 2 RUssELL, STUDIES IN
THE SCRIPTURES, paS zm.11 RUTHERFORD, HARP OF GOD 251. Cf. also id. at 234.
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The World according to Rutherford's use of the term 12 is an-
other name for a combination of religion, commerce and govern-
ment.18 Religion,14 he states, is a "Snare and a Delusion","5 invented
by Satan to draw mankind away from the knowledge and worship
of God.:' Chief offender in this regard is the Roman Catholic
Church 17 whose hierarchy 18 is plotting to rule the world. Accord-
ing to the Witnesses, the Protestant ' 9 and Jewish 20 religions have
joined forces with Catholicism 21 to "carry forward their political and
commercial schemes." 22 The links between the government, com-
merce and religion are "demonstrated" in the appointment by the
President of the United States of the former head of the U. S. Steel
Corporation as ambassador to the Vatican.23 Finally, it is predicted
by this group that this "unholy alliance" will be destroyed in the im-
minent battle of Armageddon, 24 after which the Witnesses will reign
triumphant during the Millennium. 25
Rutherford's diatribes against the Catholic Church are not par-
ticularly new 26 and his charges against the Jews have been echoed
for centuries. But his vitriolic attack upon these two groups plus his
inclusion of Protestants among the cohorts of Satan, his condemna-
tion of commerce and government and his characterization of the
salute to the American flag as an idolatrous ceremony 27 have not
been conducive to an altogether favorable reception of his message.
12 Cf. id. at 249.
13 RUTHEFORD, RELIGION 22. Cf. RUTHERFORD, HARP OF GOD 234.
14 "Religion" is defined by the Witnesses as "doing anything contrary [sic]
to the will of Almighty God." RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 18.15 Cox v. State of N. H., 312 U. S. 569, 61 Sup. Ct. 762 (1941).
16 RUTHERFORD, GOD AND THE STATE 13.
"All religions are against God and against His kingdom under Christ."
RUTHERFORD, CURE 17.
17 21 CONSOLATION, March 6, 1940, pp. 5, 10; RUTHERFORD, RELIGION 10.
Is RUTHERFORD, CURE 17; 22 CONSOLATION, Sept. 17, 1941, p. 3.
19 RUTHERFORD, RELIGION 23; RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 48; RUTHERFORD,
CURE 8.
20 RUTHERFORD, CURE 6. Cf. also id. at 8, 9.
21 Id. at 18.
22 Id. at 8.
23 RUTHERFORD, RELIGION 91.
2 4 RUTHERFORD, THEOCRACY 52; 21 CONSOLATION, Mar. 6, 1940, p. 30.
"Armageddon. The place of a great battle to be fought out on 'the great day
of God' between the powers of good and evil." (REV. [Apoc.] 16:16.) WEB-
sTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1930) 58.
25 "Millennium. A thousand years. Specif., the thousand years mentioned
in Rev. (Apoc.) xx, during which holiness is to be triumphant in the world."
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1930) 620.
26 Cf. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860, a scholarly and
minutely annotated study, by a non-Catholic, of anti-Catholic prejudice in the
United States; WILLIAMS, THE SHADOW OF THE POPE, an account of the anti-
Catholic propaganda which was especially prevalent in this country about the
year 1928.
27 "Flag saluting is in direct violation of God's law," RUTHERFORD, UNCOV-
ERED 44; cf. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010
(1940).
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Moreover, the Witnesses who believe it is their duty2  to warn the
peoples of the world of the imminence of Armageddon and the Theo-
cratic Kingdom, 29 are sometimes so overzealous as to utilize methods
which constitute a breach of the peace. An instance of these methods
is contained in the report of the Pa/na case.30
"At 8:30 o'clock in the morning of Sunday, October 29, 1939,
a crowd numbering well over one hundred calling themselves Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, came to Kutztown,3 1 a borough having less than
3,000 inhabitants. They had come there on prior occasions and the
police had received complaints of their annoying the people of the
borough. On this occasion they staged a parade on the sidewalk of
the principal street carrying placards and sandwich boards bearing the
words, 'Religion is a Snare and a Racket', and were accompanied by
a truck with a sound device and magnifier (amplifier) which caused
an unseemly racket. They rang doorbells, and when denied admit-
tance at the front door, went around to the back and entered there;
in some instances, they forced their way into houses and would not
leave although requested to do so, and at one home a young woman
had to call her father before the intruder would leave. They were
trying to sell literature of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society
and to play phonograph records attacking other religious beliefs.
They came around as many as five times to certain homes."
It was inevitable that doctrines and methods of propaganda such
as these would soon lead their protagonists into court. Litigation was
nothing new for the Witnesses since Rutherford and several other
Witnesses had been convicted of obstructing the administration of the
Selective Service Act of 1917 and had served nine months in the Fed-
eral Prison at Atlanta, Georgia.32 About 1935, however, the number
of prosecutions against Jehovah's Witnesses began to increase not
only in America but in several foreign countries.33 The contro-
versies 34 over the expulsion from school of several Witnesses who
refused to salute the American flag were then before the lower courts
and the accusations of lack of patriotism to which the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses were subjected, increased almost daily, in frequency and in-
28 RUTHERFORD, THEocRAcY 39.
29 Id. at 49.
30 Commonwealth v. Palms, 141 Pa. Super. 450, 15 A. (2d) 481, 484 (1940).31 The Witnesses make a practice of working away from home. See
Bevins v. Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1941).32 N. Y. Times, May 9, 1918; June 7, 1918; June 22, 1918; May 17, 1919.
33 Pamphlets of Jehovah's Witnesses were banned in Germany. N. Y.
Times, June 19, 1935, p. 1, col. 2. The organization was suppressed in Saxony.
N. Y. Times, July 26, 1935, p. 8, col. 4. A British commission investigating
labor troubles in the Northern Rhodesia copper belt, called the movement
"dangerously subversive". N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1935, p. 32, col. 4. The
organization was likewise banned in Hungary, N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1939,
p. 4, col. 4; New Zealand, N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1940, p. 5, col. 3; and
Australia, N. Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1941, p. 3, c. 3.
34 See (1940) 15 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 96, n.7 for a list of the flag salute
cases.
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tensity. The outbreak of war in Europe heightened public feeling
and on May 23, 1940 three Witnesses were forced to leave Del Rio,
Texas, because of a suspicion that they were Nazi agents.3 5 During
the following weeks serious disorders broke out in Maine,36 Illinois, 7
California 38 and Texas 3 9 and the cause of the Witnesses was not im-
proved by the decision in the Gobitis case 40 which upheld the action
of the Minersville, Pa., school board in expelling the children of sev-
eral Witnesses who had refused to take part in the flag salute exer-
cises. The extent to which feeling was aroused was evidenced by the
forcible "induction" into the army of a Witness who claimed to be a
conscientious objector.41
Naturally the local police throughout the country were fearful
of a repetition in their respective communities of the riots which had
occurred elsewhere. When breaches of the peace actually occurred,
of course, the disorderly conduct statutes were available 42 but in no
event could the Witnesses be denied all freedom of speech, press or
assembly under the guise of foreseeing and preventing riots. 43 Never-
theless almost every conceivable method under the existing statutes
and ordinances was utilized to silence or at least to regulate the conduct
of the Witnesses.44  Convictions in lower courts were followed by
35 N. Y. Times, May 23, 1940, p. 15, col. 3; May 24, 1940, p. 13, col. 2.36 Six Witnesses were held in connection with the shooting of two people
in Kennebunk, Me. During the demonstration which followed, the headquar-
ters of the organization were burned. N. Y. Times, June 10, 1940, p. 19, col. 4.
37 Sixty of Jehovah's Witnesses were attacked in Litchfield, Ill., for refusal
to salute the flag. Thirty other members were escorted out of town after a
riot in Elsinore, Cal. N. Y. Times, June 17, 1940, p. 17, col. 5.
38 Ibid.
89 Fifty Witnesses of Jehovah were besieged by a mob in Odessa, Tex.,
for refusing to salute the flag. Rescued by the sheriff they were jailed and on
the next morning escorted out of town. N. Y. Times, June 2, 1940, p. 14,
col. 1; June 3, 1940, p. 9, col. 6.4 0 M inersville School Dist v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010
(1940); discussed (1940) 15 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 96.
41 N. Y. Times, March 20, 1941, p. 16, col. 3. He was honorably discharged
July 15, 1941. Cf. 22 CoNSoLATIoN, Sept. 17, 1941, p. 18; also Note (1941)
15 ST. JoHq's L. Riv. 235.
42 In New York City a magazine salesman, a Witness of Jehovah, who
caused a crowd to congregate at Broadway and 44th Street, at 7:45 P. M.,
and refused to move on when ordered to do so by the police, was found guilty
of a breach of the peace. People v. Hussock, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 520 (Spec.
Sess. 1940), cert. denied, - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 733 (1941). In State v.
Chaplinsky, 18 A. (2d) 754 (N. H. 1941), the defendant was convicted of
violating a statute which prohibited the addressing of an offensive or derisive
name to another in a public street, and in State v. Langston, 195 S. C. 190,
11 S. E. (2d) 1 (1940), a breach of the peace was likewise held to have been
effected by going on the premises of private homes and playing records on the
piazza, causing crowds to gather and broadcasting religious beliefs to the public
generally by means of a loud speaker on an auto.
43 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
44 The Witnesses have been charged with sedition, disrespect to the flag,
riot, breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, conspiracy against the government,
trespassing, offending and annoying people, vagrancy, soliciting and canvassing
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appeals and soon the United States Supreme Court in the Lovell,
Schneider and CantWell4 5 cases defined the limits beyond which the
police authorities might not operate. Reduced to their lowest terms
these cases held that it is unconstitutional to vest in a public official
discretionary power:
1. To prohibit all distribution of printed matter in the public
streets;
2. To prohibit all house to house canvassing;
3. To prohibit the solicitation of money for a religious purpose
because a licensing official is not convinced of the bona fide religious
character of that purpose.
Several subsequent cases 46 followed the doctrines of these lead-
ing cases but in Pittsburgh v. Ruffner 4 7 the court distinguished the
Lovell case and upheld an ordinance which prohibited the selling of
articles from door to door without a license on the grounds that it
was a valid exercise of the police power for the prevention of fraud
such as was uncovered in Federal Trade Commission v. Standard
Education Society.48 Substantially the same reason was given for
the validation of an ordinance of Southampton, L. I., which prohibited
anyone from going from house to house unless they had a residence
or business address in the village for at least six months immediately
prior thereto4 9 The limitation of the prohibition to six months was
held to take the case out of, the rule of the Schneider case.
Another attempt to regulate the street activities of the Witnesses
was apparently successful in the Pascone case 5 0 in which an ordinance
without a license, inciting riot, assault and battery, distributing of obscene
literature, blasphemy, violating the Sabbath laws and distributing circulars
without a permit. 1 KixGDom NEws, August, 1941, no. 9, p. 1, col. 1.4 5 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct 666 (1938) ; Schneider
v. State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct 900 (1940).
46 Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N. E. (2d) 868
(1940), following the Schneider case, held that an ordinance prohibiting all
canvassing for goods, wares and merchandise without a license was invalid.
Jones v. City of Opelika, 3 So. (2d) 74 (Ala. 1941), extended this doctrine so
as to make unconstitutional the prohibition on the unlicensed selling of religious
articles even though the prohibition be limited to the public streets. State v.
Woodruff, 2 So. (2d) 577 (Fla. 1941). following Wilson v. Russell, 1 So. (2d)
569 (Fla. 1941) held substantially the same as the Jones case. Zimmerman v.
Village of London, 38 F. Supp. 582 (D. C. S. D. Ohio E. D. 1941), extended
the doctrine to an ordinance prohibiting house-to-house canvassing. Cf. also
Commonwealth v. Pascone, 308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941); Com-
monwealth v. Anderson, - Mass. -, 32 N.E. (2d) 684 (1941); McLean v.
Mackay, 124 N.- J. L. 91, 10 A. (2d) 733 (1940) ; Tucker v. Randall, 18 N. J.
Misc. 675, 15 A. (2d) 324 (1940).
47 134 Pa. Super. 192, 4 A. (2d) 224 (1939).
41 302 U. S. 112, 58 Sup. Ct 113 (1937).
49 People v. Brown and Bolnke, 175 Misc. 989, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 241
(1941).
50 Commonwealth v. Pascone, 308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941).
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prohibiting the sale of newspapers in certain designated public streets
without a license was held constitutional. Strengthening this deci-
sion was the case of City of Manchester v. Leiby 5 1 which distin-
guished the Lovell, Schneider, Hague and Cantwell cases and ruled
that a badge of identification for news distributors, for which no
charge was made but only a $.50 deposit required, was valid and im-
posed no substantial burden upon freedom of press or religion. The
Leiby case placed great stress upon the case of Shapiro v. Lyle 5
which upheld the constitutionality of a regulation of the sale of wine
for sacramental purposes.
Finally the Witnesses' "demonstration" or "information" parades
were declared subject to regulation by the ruling in Cox v. State of
N. H.5 3 which upheld the constitutionality of a conviction for parading
without a license in violation of a local ordinance.
A solution of some of these problems seems already to have been
worked out, in part at least, by the cases in which certain reasonable
restrictions and regulations regarding the Witnesses' parades, can-
vassing, use of amplifiers, etc., have been held constitutional.54 In the
light of these cases, it is possible that defective statutes may be
amended.
Until war has actually been declared, it is not likely that the re-
fusal of the Witnesses on grounds of conscience to render military
service will be a very serious source of trouble-to the public at least.
The refusal of the Witnesses to salute the flag may still be an occasion
of some disorder. But the disinclination of the courts to declare de-
linquent, children who have been suspended from school for refusing
to take part in flag salute exercises, 5 has apparently lessened the
danger which the decision in the Gobitis case ;1 seemed to forebode.
Perhaps the sort of person who could foresee the possible con-
sequences to everyone of an abuse of freedom on the part of the Wit-
nesses, would not be likely to allow such possibilities to arouse him
to violent and illegal action.
But the religious issue is a very real, serious and extremely deli-
cate problem. Everyone has a right to point out the errors which he
believes he sees in the tenets of another-religious or otherwise-and
it would be unconstitutional to forbid him to do so merely because the
one whose alleged errors are exposed might be unduly disturbed.57
But the use of vilification and invective instead of argument, the ir-
51 City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
52 30 F. (2d) 971 (D. C. W. D. Wash. N. D. 1929).
53312 U. S. 569, 61 Sup. Ct. 762 (1941).
54 See notes 46-53, supra.
55 State v. Roland Lefevre, - N. H. - (1941) ; In re Jones, 175 Misc.
451, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (1940).
56 Cf. note 40, supra. Upheld school board in suspension of children for
refusal to take part in flag salute exercises.
57 Cf. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146
(1939).
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responsible assertion of serious charges without adequate substantia-
tion and the anarchical attempt to weaken and destroy the foundations
of our present civilization without offering an immediate and adequate
substitute-these, it is submitted, constitute not a mere exercise but
an abuse of free speech. 8 This is a reality which the legislature must
face, for if it fails to do so, the disorders which have occurred in the
past are almost certain to continue.
Of course the best solution for all concerned would be the exer-
cise of more circumspection and caution by the Witnesses when it is
evident that their message is not being well received. Since they re-
gard their propaganda activities as forms of worship, 9 however, they
are not likely to let the susceptibilities of others interfere with what
they regard as their God-given duty. Hence it may be necessary to
revise some of our statutes in the interests of the general welfare.
The Witnesses are usually careful to make their accusations gen-
eral enough to avoid a civil action for libel.60 Until recently, how-
ever, it was thought that an indictment for criminal libel of a group
might lie in New York because of the similarity of our statute with
the common law definition of libel and with the statutes in other juris-
dictions.61 Since the Edmondson 6 2 case, however, it seems as though
an amendment to our statute will be necessary in order for libel of a
group to be punishable criminally. If such an extension is proposed
it should be limited to well ascertainable racial or religious groups,
however, since a broader statute would meet almost insurmountable
opposition in the legislature 3 and would, possibly, in the event of
58 Cf. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A. (2d) 754 (N. H. 1941).
59 Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 Sup. Ct. 762 (1941).
60 An action will not lie for the civil libel of a group. Comes v. Cruce, 85
Ark. 79, 107 S. W. 185 (1908). Moreover, the damages would usually be
nominal unless punitive and the defendants would all too often be found
judgment-proof.
81 Cf. prosecutor's brief in People v. Edtnondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y.
S. (2d) 257 (1938). As recently as 1936 and while the Ednondson case was
pending, A. S. Leese and W. Whitehead were convicted in England on a charge
of libeling the Jews, accusing them of ritual murders. In imposing sentence
the court said, "That the public well-being can be served by the publication of
stuff of this kind-and'I call it stuff advisedly-I cannot imagine. Nothing
can be more harmful to the public weal than that" N. Y. Times, Sept 22,
1936, p. 20, col. 6.62 Robert E. Edmondson was indicted on June 8, 1936 for an alleged libel
of the Jewish religion. Various organizations, among them the American-
Jewish Committee, the American-Jewish Congress and the American Civil
Liberties Union, while denouncing the act of the defendant in publishing the
matter complained of, stated their belief that sound public policy looking to the
safeguarding of the rights of free speech and religious liberty made it desirable
that the indictment be dismissed. This was possibly the result of a desire to
avoid the martyrdom issue which was raised. Cf. N. Y. Times, April 19, 1938,
p. 44, col. 3. The indictment was dismissed by the court on its own motion in
furtherance of justice on the ground that the indictment would not lie for a
publication of defamatory matter directed against so extensive and indefinable
a group. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (1938).
63 It is probably premature at present to suggest that slander and libel be
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its passage, be subjected to uses which were not foreseen, intended or
desired by the legislature.
A statute along these lines has been enacted in the State of New
Jersey." Several of Jehovah's Witnesses have been charged with its
violation but thus far the cases have been dismissed in every instance.65
The constitutionality of the statute is now being tested in the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.6  A bill, identical in language with the New
Jersey statute except for the preamble clause, was introduced into the
New York State Legislature last year 67 but it was opposed by the
New York Bar Association 68 because of its allegedly loose drafting
and failed to reach the floor of the Assembly or Senate.
In the event that it is thought inadvisable to extend the criminal
law to include libel of groups, it may be possible to amend Penal Law
§ 43 so as to include inter-group conflicts within its scope.6 9
But whatever course the legislature may see fit to follow, it is
submitted that action of some sort is urgent for the protection of
domestic peace and unity. The Witnesses cannot be left to the mercy
of mob violence; 70 nor is a legislative persecution proposed. But in
dispensed with in our political campaigns. But cf. George E. Sokolsky, These
Days, N. Y. Sun, Nov. 8, 1941, p. 8, col. 6. "Some day [Americans] will
wonder why they have to vote for the queer folks who are the only ones who
will submit to the brutality of a campaign."
64 N. J. REv. STAT. 2 :157B-1 to 8, icI.. Jehovah's Witnesses feel that
this statute was directed specifically against them and "rushed through the
legislature at Trenton under the lash of an agent of the Roman Catholic
hierarchy." Under this bill they declare "a chance remark, a grin, or even a
look, may arouse some fanatical Catholic's ire, 'incite' the animosity of a
straight-laced Protestant, or aviaken the hostility of a so-called Jew who is
subject to illusions of grandeur. And before you know it, you are in the
hoosegow or minus your roll, or both." 16 THE GOLDEN AGE, June 5, 1935,
p. 554.
65 E.g, State v. Goux, N. J. 2d Cr. Jud. Dist. Ct., Bergen County (July,
1938), Judge Leland F. Ferry presiding.
66 State of New Jersey v. Klapprott. Defendants were indicted under the
so-called Propaganda statute. (Supra note 64.) "They filed Demurrers to the
indictment and the Court having ruled against the Demurrers found the defen-
dants guilty. Cases now being considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court."
(From letter written by Prosecutor of the Pleas of Sussex County N. J.,
Sept. 9, 1941.)
87 INT. A. 474, PR. A. 483; INT. S. 311, PR. S. 323. Jan. 23, 1941.68 AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMIT=EE ON
CRImiNAL COURTS, LAW AND PROCEDURE: BULLETIN 1, 1941, memo. 2.
69 PENAL LAW § 43, prescribes a penalty for acts for which no punishment
is expressly prescribed. It is a drag-net statute, designed to cover acts inimical
to the welfare of the state which are difficult of definition. The very broadness
of its scope suggests the extreme caution and painstaking care with which any
proposed amendment to this statute ought to be drafted. Otherwise it might
easily be used as an iristruiment of injustice.
7 0 In drawing up legislation it would be well to keep in mind that in the
usual criminal libel cases, the violence is committed or threatened by a third
party against the libeled party. In the Witness' cases the violence is usually
committed against the party (the Witnesses) uttering the statement which the
legislature might see fit to declare libelous.
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the light of European experience as to the frightful but logical results
of an unrestrained outpouring of intolerant and bigoted hatred-racial
or religious-it is time for Americans to re-examine this question in
its entirety and provide a remedy which will be effective as well as
just and constitutional.
REv. JosEPH T. TiNNELLY, C.M.
